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ABSTRACT
This thesis conducts a performance simulation of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and
Kerberos security solutions. Specifically this study builds a working modeling framework of the Kerberos
security service and the CellCase ATM encryption service. The model is used to look at how these services
affect throughput by inserting waiting times in a series of queues in a small-sized network.
The results of algorithms for calculating cryptographic delay are then inserted in an OPNET model
and examined against a control model for validation. These models assume a linear relationship between
the cryptographic service time and the throughput. Further relationships between service time and
throughput are suggested for use in other security systems.
This thesis concludes that the modeling framework presented is viable for creating higher fidelity
performance simulations of network security services. Further, this thesis suggests model validation
directions for future research.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to propose a simulation framework for encryption-
enabled communications services using the OPNET™ Modeler simulation system with
particular attention to the field of ATM encryption and PKI authentication. The field of
modeling data communication networks is relatively new and the modeling and
simulation community has not given substantial attention to modeling cryptographic
performance effects. This must change. The proliferation of virtual private network
encryptors, link encryption and certification services are beginning in the commercial
world. These services can have tremendous impact on the performance characteristics of
the network across the enterprise.
This thesis looks at two cryptographic systems and creates novel performance
models for each. The first is Kerberos, which has been a third party authentication
system for several years. The second model presented is the CellCase™ ATM
encryption system. Both models are queuing models. This thesis has the premise that a
cryptographic negotiation is nothing more than a series of queuing delays across the
enterprise that require service times to compute and negotiate the appropriate
cryptographic protocols.
In both models, there are two critical factors. The first are the service times that a
particular encryption schemes needs across the negotiation process. The second is the
number of authentications allowed per negotiation. The models in this thesis deal with
the first in the Kerberos model and CellCase model and assumes that an every negation
requires an authorization.
This thesis provides a summary of current ATM security issues and standards and
Public Key Infrastructure and the OPNET™ models for each. ATM is being fielded
throughout the DoD and so is third party Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). This thesis is
a good starting point to examine third party PKI issues with the Kerberos Model and to
examine "key agile" call setup processes.
These models are in a very immature form but they are novel. There is a solid
starting point to build higher fidelity cryptographic performance models from the lessons
learned from this research. The performance of future DoD networking efforts will very
probably need to factor in delay and throughput performance factors in encrypted data
networks, particularly as network managers scale PKI resources to larger and larger
levels.
The next phase of this research would be twofold First, we need to validate the
Kerberos and CellCase™ OPNET™ models presented in this thesis. The Kerberos
model can be adapted to fit DISA's ongoing PKI initiative. Taking these models and
adapting them to a small PKI network like Defense Travel Office PKI testbed would
allow real world validation of the algorithms in this thesis and the OPNET™ model.
Second, the models here are shown as very simple point-to-point networks. Research
into adapting this model to a multiple server/client/authenticator network in the Kerberos
OPNET™ model would yield valuable insights into the performance problems that




The wide area telecommunications infrastructure is
changing rapidly from an unencrypted one to an encrypted
world. Secure telecommunications were, until very recently,
only reserved for the military and the largest of
corporations
.
Concurrent with this change, we are seeing a complete
overhaul of the public switched telephone network. The
overwhelming majority of the current telecommunications
system is based on circuit switching, time division
multiplexing, copper cabling and static routing. We are
shifting to a network based on more adaptive routing, fiber
optic cabling and statistical multiplexing. This shift in
media, routing, and transmission has brought forth new
standards such as the Synchronous Optical NETwork (SONET)
for transmission services and Wideband Division Multiplexing
(WDM) for multiplexing services. It is far from certain, but
it appears that the replacement for the switching component
of the PSTN will be based on a statistical multiplexing
scheme based on Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) standards.
The following quote is from the DoD Contingency C4ISR
Handbook: "The far term strategy for DISN support is
intended to fully populate the entire DISN, both fixed and
deployed, with identical technical architectures. This will
eliminate any discernable interface or transition points. It
should be noted that, while the current deployed segment
vision is based on ATM technology, it is not an irrevocable
decision." [CONT 98]
All of these standards are in a state of flux. The
security services for this emerging network are in a state
of infancy and the modeling of these services is also very
sparse. However, one trend looks relevant. The only true
model of a wide area secure system available to industry and
academia is the one provided by the military, which has been
securing networks for years using encryption at the trunk,
group and loop level
.
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and analyze
the performance of a certificate-based security framework.
This will be done by taking a known queuing analysis of
Kerberos, converting it to an OPNET model, and then




Significant challenges exist in securing a global wide-
area network. The core of this challenge is to organize
cryptologic systems at multiple levels in the protocol stack
without causing a significant performance problem throughout
the network. The engine that has made secure communications
happen within the military has been an array of symmetric
key devices that are placed at various locations within the
network. These inline network encryptors (INE) are used to
link encrypt both the Internet Protocol (IP) and voice
networks in the Department of Defense (DoD)
.
DoD networks currently operate almost exclusively using
IP for data transfer across the various interconnected
networks. However, early use of ATM networks has been
deemed very successful. The generally accepted time frame
for this integration of an ATM switching architecture is 3-7
years with significant deployments occurring right now.
[COHE 96]
The upcoming ascendancy of ATM networking requires an
analysis of the performance impact of any and all security
services unique to the ATM networking environment. DoD
needs to understand how much security will cost in terms of
traditional performance parameters such as call setup time
compared with encrypted call setup time. It is our hope
that the novel simulation presented in this thesis will help
create a framework for future modeling of the services.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remaining chapters in this thesis will be presented
as follows:
1. Asynchronous Transfer Mode
Chapter II will discuss the benefits of ATM and
describe how ATM will become the backbone of military
command and control systems
.
2. Public Key Infrastructure
Chapter III will describe the public key infrastructure
(PKI) and the performance considerations involved in
deploying a public-key-based security system.
3 . Basic Description of Secure ATM Channels and the
Kerberos Protocol
Chapter IV will describe several schemes for securing
ATM channels. The focus of this chapter is the description
of algorithms such as key-agile and cell -based encryption
methods and the current technology developed to institute
those methods. This chapter will also describe the Kerberos
protocol, which is the prototype for the analysis of ATM
channels
.
4 . OPNET Simulation of the Kerberos Authentication
Service and Secure ATM Channels
Chapter V will present a node level analysis of the
problem at hand. The chapter will use an OPNET node level
analysis to model the encryption devices and the
certification servers. This chapter also discusses the
metrics that we will be using to do a meaningful analysis of
secure ATM traffic and the Kerberos authentication system.
5. Conclusions
Chapter VI recommends areas of additional research and
concludes with a summary analysis of the ATM security scheme
and the simulation of secure ATM channels. This chapter will
also describe the results of the simulation and concludes
with a summary analysis of the validity concerns for the
models developed.
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II. ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFER MODE
A. ATM OVERVIEW
Asynchronous Transfer Mode is a telecommunications
standard where information packets are transferred
asynchronously. The first research on ATM and its related
technologies was published in 1983 by two research centers,
CNET and AT&T Bell Labs. In 1984, the research center of
Alcatel Bell in Antwerp started to develop the ATM concept.
ATM has the same basic characteristics of packet
switching, but also the delay characteristics of circuit
switching technology. ATM is widely viewed as the
communications technology of the 21 st century, and its
impact is expected to be much like the ubiquitous PCM (pulse
code modulation) , which is used widely throughout current
telecommunications networks [KUMA 95]
.
There are four advantages that ATM brings compared to
standard packet switching or pure circuit switching. The
first advantage is that ATM, because of its channeled nature
enables network planners to avoid fractal, self -similar
traffic patterns. Self -similar traffic patterns, such as
Ethernet and standard packet switched networks, are
exceptionally difficult on which to measure quality of
service (QoS) parameters. The channelization of ATM traffic
allows telecommunications managers to use statistical
distributions and techniques to do the same type of traffic
analysis that existed in time division multiplexed (TDM)
networks
.
The second advantage of ATM is that you can seamlessly
multiplex data streams with differing delay characteristics
to a single point. Voice, video and data traffic on a
network channel have very different transmission needs. The
transmission needs of these services are so different that
you really can't have uncontrolled access to the channel and
have decent QoS . An email with a fifty slide Power Point
presentation could potentially block out a voice call if
that were the case.
The third advantage of ATM is the reduction of
transport costs. The statistical multiplexing technique
that ATM uses enables the available bandwidth to be used
much more efficiently than traditional TDM schemes. This
mechanism will be described in the next section.
The last advantage of ATM is that it provides for
dynamic bandwidth allocation. This advantage goes hand in
hand with the reduction of transport costs. The flexible
bandwidth allocation that ATM provides allows the network to
give bandwidth when the user application requires it. This
is very different than time division multiplexing, which
gives bandwidth even if it is not needed by the application.
B. ATM FRAMEWORK
This section addresses the basic principle behind ATM:
divide and conquer. [KUMA 95] At the most basic level, ATM
divides all data into 48 byte cells with a 5-byte header.
The process of dividing the data stream into cells is called
segmentation. The process of reassembling the cells into
coherent traffic is called reassembly. The multiplexing
scheme that ATM is replacing for voice traffic is TDM. A
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Figure 1 - TDM
In both networks, several data sources are multiplexed
on a single link. In TDM networks the effective bandwidth
is simply the sum of individual sources' bandwidths. If
traffic source A has x bits per second (bps) and traffic
source B has y bps then a TDM network would use x+y bps of
bandwidth. ATM, using statistical multiplexing, has an
effective bandwidth of z bps, where z < (x+y) because the
multiplexer takes advantage of the fact that all individual
sources are not continuously transmitting. Figure 2 shows an













Figure 2 - Statistical Multiplexing
The 5 -byte headers in ATM have little functionality so
the network can process them very fast . Figure 3 shows how
traffic of different speeds, 64 KBPS, 2Mbps, and 34Mbps are
divided into equal 48 byte packets. [KUMA 95]
C. ATM PROTOCOL
The fixed 53-byte size of ATM cells along with the very
austere error correction and retransmission characteristics
of the ATM protocol give ATM a tremendous advantage for
applications such as high-speed networks. Other
technologies such as X.25 and Frame Relay perform frame
10
delimitation and error checking. X.25 has a packet





















Figure 3 - ATM
The elimination of these functions is an advantage of
the ATM network because it simplifies the switching and
processing functionality of the network, leading to enhanced























Figure 4 - ATM Protocol Stack
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Higher layers of the protocol take care of the
functions that are not performed at the ATM layer. The ATM
protocol stack is roughly analogous to the seven layer OSI
reference model
.
The higher layers of the reference model convert the
user information into standard ATM cells. The ATM layer
adds 5 bytes of header information. This header carries
information to route the cells in the ATM network. The ATM
cell header consists of six different fields of varying
sizes: Generic Flow Control (GFC) , Virtual Channel
Identifier (VCI) , Virtual Path Identifier (VPI) , Payload
Type (PT) , Cell Loss Priority (CLP) , and Header Error
Control (HEC)
.
1. Generic flow control (GFC)
The GFC provides contention resolution and simple flow
control for shared medium-access arrangements at the
customer premises equipment (CPE)
.
2. Virtual channel identifier (VCI)
The VCI is used to establish connections using
translation tables at switching nodes that map incoming and
outgoing VCIs.
3. Virtual path identifier (VPI)
The VPI maps groups of VCIs. The VPI is used in
setting up the end-to-end virtual path connections of
multiple virtual path segments.
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4. Payload type (PT)
The PT is a three-bit field that is used to
differentiate management and data cells traversing the same
virtual circuit.
5. Cell loss priority (CLP)
The CLP is a one-bit flag used to determine cells of
lower priority. Depending on network congestion, the cells
with a set CLP may be discarded.
6. Header error control (HEC)
Header error control (HEC) performs a CRC calculation
on the first 4 bytes of the header field for error detection
and correction. [KUMA 95]
Within the ATM cell header there are two formats: the
user to network interface (UNI format) , which is the header
format for the cells between the user and the network.
There is also the network to network interface (NNI format)
,
which are between ATM backbone links. The UNI and NNI cell
formats are shown in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5 - Cell Formats
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D. ATM SERVICE CATEGORIES
1. Switched Virtual Circuits
A user can establish ATM connections in one of two
ways. The user can set up a switched virtual circuit (SVC)
or a permanent virtual circuit (PVC) . A switched virtual
circuit is analogous to the voice telephone network where
you do not have a pre -determined path set up for you. A
switched virtual circuit is set up in a manner similar to a
direct-dialed telephone call.
2 . Permanent Virtual Circuits
PVC service is similar to dedicated lines. The
installation of PVC provides several advantages. First, the
provisioning time is very short, with close to real-time
provisioning of the circuit. Second, there are no call
establishment procedures to go through. Third, PVCs provide
excellent flexibility for extensions. The downside of PVC
service is the cost and time required installing the
service
.
3 . Call Setup Procedure
This will be discussed in some detail, as it is a very
important metric in the performance of secure ATM channels.
A normal call exchange is made of six messages. The six
messages are: setup, call proceeding, connect, connect
acknowledge, release, release complete. There are two other
messages that are common to ATM signaling: status inquiry






























Figure 6 - ATM Call Exchange
a) Setup Signal.
The setup phase is sent by the source to the ATM
switch to initiate a connection.
b) Call Proceeding Signal
The call proceeding signal is sent from the
originating switch to the source acknowledging the start of
the process to establish a call. The call proceeding signal
may also be sent from the destination to the terminating
switch.
c) Connect Signal
The connect signal is sent from the destination to
the terminating switch, passed through the network, and then
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from the originating switch to the source for call
acceptance.
d) Connect Acknowledge Signal
The connect acknowledge is sent by the source to
the originating switch and then passed on from the
terminating switch to the destination to complete the call
setup process.
e) Release Signal
The release signal is sent by either the source or
destination to terminate the call. The destination can also
use the release signal with error codes to reject call
setup.
f) Release complete signal
This signal is sent by the source, destination or
other switches to complete the call teardown process and
acknowledge release of network resources.
g) Other Signals
There are two other common messages : the status
inquiry signal and the status signal . The status inquiry is
sent by the source, destination, or network switches to




This chapter has given a very abridged overview of what
ATM is and, in particular, what is involved in the call
setup procedure. This information will link to the
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III. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY
1. Cryptographic Engines
Cryptography is the science of coding data so that the
cost of improperly acquiring the data is greater than any
benefit gained by having the data in the first place. A
cryptographic engine is a mathematical technique to code
this data. A cryptographic engine requires three elements:
plaintext data, ciphertext data and a cryptographic
algorithm.
There are three types of cryptographic algorithms . The
first type is called a message digest or hashing algorithm.
The second type is called a secret key algorithm. The last,
and most recent, algorithm family is called public key
cryptography
.
Each of these algorithms requires a mathematical value
called a key. A key has two values associated with it. The
first, the key length, is the length in bits of the key.
The second, the key space, is a collection of all
mathematical values that have the same length of the key. A
key of length n generates a key space of 2n for a binary
cryptographic engine. [FEGH 98]
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2 . Cryptographic Attacks
There are three major forms of cryptographic attacks
that are relevant to the scope of this thesis. The first is
called an ciphertext-only attack where a cryptanalyst
intercepts some ciphertext and wishes to obtain the
plaintext or recover the key. This can be done in several
ways. The first method is called the brute-force attack
where the analyst does an exhaustive search of the entire
key space to find a matching key. The second brute- force
method is called a dictionary attack where you try to match
the encrypted text with common known text encrypted by the
same cryptoengine
.
The second form of attack is the known-plaintext
attack. This is where the cryptanalyst has access to a
ciphertext message and a corresponding plaintext message.
It is extremely easy for the analyst to acquire both of
these messages. E-mail applications, for example, place
standard headers at the beginning of each message, which
provides the analyst with a known plaintext
.
The third form of attack is the chosen-plaintext
attack. This is a subtle variant of the known-plaintext
attack in which the cryptanalyst can select the plaintext
that the cryptosystem sends. The classic example of this
attack was the breaking of the Japanese cryptosystem before
the Battle of Midway. The U.S. Navy sent a bogus message
that Midway Island's water condenser was down. This
20
effectively inserted these words in the Japanese secure
communications system and gave the U.S. Navy words that they
could key on and use to break the code.
B. SECRET KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
1. Secret Key Algorithms
Secret key cryptography uses a secret key to encrypt a
message into ciphertext. Secret key cryptography is also
known as symmetric cryptography. Figure 7 shows two
parties, Alice and Bob, who use secret key cryptography to
protect their message from Eve, who wishes to intercept it.
Alice and Bob must agree on a shared secret key before they
can share traffic. Alice can run an advertisement in The
New York Times to inform Bob of the key. She can tell him







AT ice_Pirm4xt Encryptor 1 Encryptor2 Bob_PLint«xt
Figure 7 - Secret Key Encryption
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The problem with this is that Eve could intercept the
key if Alice used these methods. Key distribution centers
have been proposed and used to solve the secret key exchange
and have been used in the military for decades. These
centers suffer from scalability and administration problems
that make them difficult to implement.
There are a variety of secret key algorithms. The
mathematics of each varies, as does the security. Table 1
shows current secret-key algorithms.
Algorithm Name Mode Key Length (bits)
Blowfish Block cipher Variable up to 448
DES Block cipher 56
IDEA Block cipher 128
RC2 Block cipher Variable (1 to 2048)
RC4 Stream cipher Variable (1 to 2048)
RC5 Block cipher Variable (1 to 2048)
Triple DES Block cipher 56 (112 effective)
Table 1 - Secret Key Algorithms
Secret key ciphers are generally used as bulk traffic
encryption ciphers. The secret key algorithm performance is
much faster then other forms of encryption such as public
key. This speed advantage allows secret key ciphers to be




Block ciphers take a fixed-size block of plaintext,
usually 64 bits, and produce a fixed-size block of
ciphertext, usually at the same size as the input block.
The length of the key may be 56 such as with DES or 12 8 for
the IDEA algorithm.
The mapping from an input block to an output block must
be one-to-one to make the algorithm reversible. If more
than one input block is mapped to one output block, the
algorithm can encrypt, but it cannot decrypt. The block
size is a critical issue in the field of ATM security
because the ATM cell format does not conform to any
conventional blocksize used by any current or proposed
secret-key algorithms. [FEGH 98]
3. Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers operate over one bit (sometimes one 8-
bit byte or one 32 -bit word) of input data at a time. A
specific and widely used stream cipher is the one-time-pad.
The one-time-pads are stream ciphers that perform an XOR of
one bit of an input stream with one randomly generated bit
to get one bit out of the output stream. The sequence of
random bits constitutes the session key, or the pad, which
is the same size as the input and output streams.
23
C. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
1. Public Key Algorithms
Public key cryptography was officially invented by
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1975. Recently,
there has been widespread speculation that the concept was
invented by the British Intelligence Agency GCHQ many years
earlier. The scheme involves the use of two distinct keys,
a public key and a private key. The public key is freely
distributed to all entities that you want to communicate to
while the private key is kept under very close hold. Figure
8 shows how our couple, Alice and Bob, can communicate using
a public key cryptosystem.




Encryption Decryption Bob_Pl aintext
Figure 8 - A public key cryptosystem
2 . Mathematical Foundations of Public Key
Cryptography
Public key cryptography is based on the idea that you
have an easy computation and a hard computation. Most
public key encryption is based either on integer
24
factorization or discrete logarithms that provide both easy
and hard computations. Public key systems based on integer
factorization rely on the fact that multiplying large prime
numbers is easy while factoring large numbers into primes is
hard. The problem of finding a simple way to factor large
numbers into primes has been looked at by some of the
greatest minds in human history and has yet to be solved. A
system based on integer factorization, such as RSA, will not
allow a deriving of the public key from the private key
within a computationally feasible timespan.
The second mathematical technique is the Discrete
Logarithm. In modulo n (n>0) , two integers are equivalent
if they have the same remainder when divided by n. The
remainder of an integer m divided by n is the smallest
nonnegative integer that differs from m by a multiple of n.
The numbers 6, -4, and 16 all have the same remainder 6,
when divided by 10, and therefore, are equivalent in the
arithmetic modulo 10. The easy computation (analogous to
multiplication in integer factorization) is called modular
exponentiation. Modular exponentiation ax modulo n is the
exponentiation in arithmetic modulo n. For example, 3 4
modulo 10 is 81 modulo 10 which is the same as 1 modulo 10.
The hard computation is finding the discrete logarithm or
the inverse of modular exponentiation. This is the problem
of finding the x where ax = b modulo n. If llx = 1 modulo
10, then x equals 2. [STIN 97]
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The Dif fie-Hellman key exchange algorithm uses the
technique of discrete logarithms to exchange keys. This is
of particular interest because the key exchange mechanism
used by the CellCase ATM encryption system uses Diffie-
Hellman. The Dif f ie-Hellman Algorithm uses the exponent d
to hide a key and sends e = gd modulo p along an unsecured
channel to another party. Eve can know e, g, and p but
cannot solve for d [STIN 97]
.
3 . Public Key Cryptography Standards
Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) are a set of
standards that the RSA Laboratories developed in
collaboration with Apple, Digital, Lotus, Microsoft, MIT,
Northern Telecom, and Sun Microsystems. The PKCS is
analogous to the Request For Comment (RFC) framework that is
responsible for standardizing the Internet. There are
currently 12 papers that make up the PKCS, labeled PKCS#1 to
PKCS#12
.
4 . Public key versus Secret Key Length
The relative strengths of public key and secret key
cryptography are not one to one . For example to obtain the
security of a 40 bit secret key cryptosystem you would have
to have a 2 74 bit key length for a public key cryptosystem.
Table 2 shows the relative strength of secret keys versus
public keys[FEGH 98].
26










Table 2 - Strength of Public and Secret Keys
D. HASH ALGORITHMS
Hash algorithms or message digest algorithms take a
variable sized message and return a fixed length message as
output. Hashes are critical in the generation of digital
signatures. A hash must have the following properties to be
secure. First, the hash must be able to work on messages of
any size. Second, it must produce a hash of a fixed size.
Third, it must be relatively easy to compute, so that it is
a practical means of authentication. Fourth, the hash must
depend on the whole message. Last, it must be prohibitively
expensive to invert the hashing process.
Two hashing structures are relevant today, Message
Digest 5 (MD5) and the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) . The
SHA was developed by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and was deemed the standard for the
Federal Government in 1993. Table 3 provides a comparison
between these two algorithms. [FEGH 98]
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Algorithm MD5 SHA
Digest Length 128 bits 160 bits
Basic Processing
Unit
512 bits 512 bits












Table 3 - A comparison of MD5 and SHA
E. DIGITAL SIGNATURES
1. Introduction
A digital signature is a data item that confirms the
origin and integrity of a message or entity. This is very
important even if the message is encrypted because it is an
extra check on the entity's identity. There are two major
Digital Signature Standards: RSA and the Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) . Figure 9 shows how digital signatures are
generated and verified.
Alice first computes the digest of her message and uses
her private key to sign the digest. Alice then transmits the
message and the signed digest to Bob. Bob then decrypts the
message and the hash and compares the two. If they are
equal then the message by Alice is authentic. If they are
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Figure 9 - Digital Signature Scheme
2 . RSA Digital Signatures
The RSA digital signature was the defacto standard
until the Federal Government proposed the DSS in 1991. The
RSA signature scheme uses MD5 for the hashing algorithm and
the RSA PK algorithm for encryption.
3. DSS Digital Signatures
The DSS digital signature became the federal standard
for signatures in 1991. The DSS standard uses the El Gamal
PK algorithm for encryption and the SHA-1 standard for
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hashing. El Gamal is a PK algorithm that uses discrete logs
as its mathematical engine. RSA uses integer factorization.
F. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader
to the components of public key cryptography and secret key
cryptography. The simulation of the ATM Security solutions
now proposed involves secret key cryptography for encryption
and public key cryptography for key exchange and
authentication. The concepts presented in this chapter and
Chapter II will be tied together in the next chapter.
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF SECURE ATM CHANNELS AND THE KERBEROS
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
A. ATM SECURITY FRAMEWORK
The ATM Forum Security Working Group proposes a
Security Framework that addresses the basic requirements for
ATM security. This framework identifies the main security
objectives for ATM security: confidentiality, data
integrity, accountability, and availability. The principal
functions, which the ATM security system should provide
under the ATM Forum framework, are listed in Table 4.
The ATM Forum Security Specification includes a very
general interpretation of these functional areas. [SPEC97]
The framework is abstract enough to provide a guideline to
different ATM instances. It is interesting to note that
only the first eight out of ten requirements provide
security services . The last two are required to support the
maintenance of security services.
1. ATM Security Scope
There are three planes relevant to ATM security. The
three planes are the user plane, the control plane and the








Entities on network must not
be able to gain access to
information or resources
unless authorized.
Protection of Confidentiality All stored and communicated
data must be confidential
Protection of Data Integrity System must guarantee the
integrity of the stored and
communicated data
Strong Accountability Entities can not repudiate
actions or effects that they
cause on the network
Activities Logging The security system must
support the capability to
retrieve information
Alarm Reporting The security system must be





Security Recovery System must be able to
recover from breaches of
security
The security system must be
able to manage the security
services derived from the
above requirements
Security Management
Table 4 - ATM Forum Security Framework Functions
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Figure 10 - ATM Entities Interaction
The entities in the user plane are used to transfer
user data. The entities in the control plane deal with
connection establishment, release and other connection
functions. The management plane entities perform management
and coordination functions that relate to both the user
plane and the control plane. All three planes and the ATM
layer must be included in the ATM security scope. [SPEC97]
2. Placement of ATM Security Services
The user plane is responsible for all interactions
between the user and the network. The user plane provides
services such as access control, authentication, data
confidentiality, key exchange, certification infrastructure
and integrity in an ideal ATM security framework. [SPEC97]
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The control plane will configure the network to provide
a communication channel for a user. Figure 10 shows that
the control plane interacts with all other entities in the
ATM entity model. The critical services to secure the
control plane are authentication and
confidentiality. [SPEC97]
The management plane security is also important.
Management plane security considerations should consider the
following items: bootstrapping security, authenticated
neighbor discovery, the Interim Local Management Interface
security and PVC security. [CHUA 96]
The last, and most important, layer of concern is the
ATM layer. This is the layer where most ATM security
solutions that have been proposed or under development
reside. ATM security at the ATM layer must be implemented at
the end-to-end, edge-to-edge, and ATM endpoint switches.
Security at the ATM layer is the focus of the
Secant/CellCase product line that evolved out of the MCNC
effort [MCNC 99] , the Cylink ATM encryptor, and the GTE
TACLANE and FASTLANE encryptor [COHE 96]
.
3 . ATM Security Challenges
The first challenge in ATM network security is to
design a cryptographic mechanism that will match the high
communication speed of the switch. Most traditional
cryptographic mechanisms operate within 10 Mbps when
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implemented in software and 100 Mbps when implemented in
hardware. This creates a significant speed mismatch between
the speed of the switch which will operate at hundreds of
Mbps up to Gbps and the cryptographic engine that operates
significantly slower.
The second challenge in ATM network security goes hand
in hand with the first. The ATM cell payload is 48 bytes,
which means that any block-ciphering scheme with a block
size greater than 384 bits cannot be used without block
chaining. If the block size is smaller than 384 bits the
cryptographic algorithm needs to be block chained, which




The Enigma2 project is a collaboration between the
Microcomputing Network Center (MCNC) , Portland State
University and the Mayo Clinic to provide a secure key-agile
ATM security scheme under a DARPA contract. The Enigma2
project has spunoff a commercial effort by the Celotek
Corporation (formerly Secant Corporation) with the
development of CellCase ATM cryptographic systems products.
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2. Project Overview
The Enigma2 project mission was to investigate issues
associated with secure communications over public ATM
networks. Enigma2 involves the design, fabrication and
evaluation of a proof of concept key-agile ATM cryptographic
system using the DES and RSA algorithms. Key agility refers
to the ability of a cryptographic unit to dynamically change
keys. [SHB95] The design goal was for the system to support
full duplex secure communications at 622 Mbps . Up to 65,000
simultaneous connections can be active in the system with a
unique cryptographic key for each connection. [MCNC99]
Enigma2 includes efforts in architecture development,
software and hardware design, integration and analysis. The
result was three Beta CellCase units that supported DES
encryption and decryption of ATM cell payloads at the OC-12c
rate. There were many other tasks involved in this effort,
ranging from covert channel analysis to key management
software
.
The Enigma2 project claimed some significant
accomplishments that are summarized as follows: creation of
cryptographic systems technologies, transfer of these
systems to industry, and understanding of ATM security
issues. The Enigma2 project: (1) designed the first ATM
cryptographic system that offers DES encryption at the OC-12
rate, (2) supports key agility by encrypting each VC with a
unique key, (3) supports transparent operation of
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cryptographic systems with existing ATM systems and with ATM
Forum standard signaling, and (4) supports dynamic key
distribution using a public key protocol. [MCNC98]
C. ENCRYPTION SYSTEMS
1. Link Encryption System
A link encryption system provides protection at the physical
protocol layer. Figure 11 provides an example of this type
of mechanism. This type of system can be compatible with
and transparent to larger low layer protocols such as SONET,
but it encrypts all data. [SHB95] This approach has the
benefit of preventing traffic analysis by an eavesdropper.
This mechanism is the overwhelming type of cryptosystem used
in current military telecommunications networks.
Figure 11 - Link Encryption System
2 . ATM cell encryption system
ATM cell encryption codes the user data while leaving
the cell headers in the clear. This approach permits
privacy of communications with the full flexibility of ATM
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networking while securing the data traffic at the switch
nodes and the interswitch links. This is a much less
secure method then link encryption because of the ability
of an eavesdropper to gather network control information
from the unsecured cell header. Figure 12 shows a
notional cell encryption scheme.
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Figure 12 - Cell Encryption
3. Key-agile cell encryption system
A third scheme for securing ATM networks is to use key
agility. ATM uses key agility by having a unique key for
each active VC in the system. Figure 13 shows a simple
example of a key-agile ATM encryption system.
4. Algorithm-Agile encryption system
A novel proposal by researchers at Sandia National
Laboratory calls for using different cryptographic
algorithms for each VC. [THBW98] The QoS ramifications of
this cryptosystem, particularly with heterogeneous traffic,






Figure 13 - Key-agile encryption system
D. SECURE CALL ESTABLISHMENT
1. Overview
The Enigma2 encryption effort creates significant
complexity to the call setup efforts. This complexity is a
result of negotiating three types of security related
messages in addition to the regular ATM call setup process.
The first negotiation that has to happen is an exchange of
authentication in the form of a certificate. The second
negotiation is a key exchange between the encryption
devices . The third message is a handshake to implement the
traffic encryption. There are two different types of
protocols used in this system: point-to-point connection and
point-to-multipoint connection protocols.
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2. Point- to-Point Connection Protocol
This protocol design deals with the call setup process.
The notation used to describe the protocol is:
Ca = A's public key certificate
Na = A's challenge
Ea (M) = Encrypt M with A's public key
Sa(M) = Sign Hash of M with A's private key
Kab = Session key for flow from A to B
SI = SETUP information
ID = Identifier for data connection
Figure 14 shows the point-to-point call set up. Calling
host is the first ATM switch. Called host is the second ATM
switch. Crypto A and crypto B are the two encryption
devices. [MCNC97]
3. Point- to-Multipoint Connection Protocol
The point-to-multipoint connection protocol is somewhat
more complex than the point-to-point connection protocol.
This thesis defers simulation of this protocol to future
research.
40
Caling Host Crypto B
Sa(Ba(r\fc , Kab)) Sb(Ea(Na , Kba))
Figure 14 - Point to Point Call Setup
E. INTRODUCTION TO KERBEROS
This section provides a basic description of the
Kerberos authentication system and protocol. Information
processing systems have grown ever more heterogeneous and
decentralized and security solutions such as Kerberos have
evolved as part of this process.
This thesis examines the Kerberos protocol to develop a
model based on queuing analysis. This model will then be
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bootstrapped to create a framework for modeling the CellCase
service
.
In a decentralized environment the internal security is
essentially one of arbitrating who gains access to network
services. This problem is characterized in three steps:
identification, authentication and authorization [NEUM 93]
.




The Kerberos system has the mission of providing
authentication and authorization services. The Kerberos
system is centered on the concept of the ticket. The
Kerberos ticket is a cryptographically generated token that
grants access for a function or a device. Kerberos was
developed as a part of Project Athena, at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT)
.
2 . The Sequence of Steps in the implementation of the
Kerberos Protocol
The sequence of steps executed in the implementation of
the Basic Kerberos protocol is shown in Figure 15. The
first step is simply a request from the client to the
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Figure 15 - Basic Kerberos Protocol
The second step is the reply from the TGS to the
client. The TGS will respond with the session key Kc s that
will be encrypted by the client key encryption key Kc TCS .
The response of the TGS in step two also includes a ticket,
TKT, which consists of the key for communicating between the
client and server Kcs , its validity interval, the client
name C and the address of C. The message with TKT is
encrypted by another key Ks TCS , which is the fixed symmetric
key between the server and the TGS
.
The third step is where the client C sends the ticket
TKT and an authenticator Ac to the server S. This message is
encrypted by Kc . Step 4 transmits A8 encrypted by Kc s from
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the server back to the client. Step 5 concludes the process
with the transmission of a secure message from C to S
encrypted by Kc#8 .
3. SUMMARY
This chapter provided a basic description of the
contemporary ATM security framework and security solutions.
The call setup sequence described here is particularly
noteworthy, as that will be one of the three simulation
models presented in this thesis.
This chapter also provided a very brief description of
the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos protocol
will be modeled in succeeding chapters as a core example of
an OPNET cryptographic performance model based on queues
.
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V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SECURE ATM CHANNELS AND
KERBEROS AUTHENICATION SERVICE
A. KERBEROS AUTHENICATION PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
1. Queuing Analysis of Kerberos Protocol
A very flexible performance model of the Kerberos
protocol has been given by El-Hadidi, Hengazi, and Asian
[ELHA 97] . This thesis will restate this model and expand
on the published results. This study will also reference
[ELHA 97] in the algorithm developed in the following
chapter to model the CellCase ATM encryption unit.
Figure 16 shows a time sequence diagram from [ELHA 97]
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Figure 16 - Time Sequence Diagram for Kerberos Network
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The time sequence begins with an application issuing a
request for accessing a specific server. This request is
forced to wait a time Wcl before the client can service the
request in the time interval S cl producing an unencrypted
message. At the end of the interval S cl the unencrypted
request is sent to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and
arrives at time t^, waits for Wtl to be served by the TGS
and stays for the interval Stl to be served by the TGS
processor. The result of this is an encrypted response
message. At the end of the interval Stl the request is then
sent back to the client and arrives at time t^, waits for
Wc2 to be served, and undergoes a service time of Sc2 to
service the encrypted message. The output from the client
is an encrypted ticket and an authentication message that
goes back to the server at time t n3 . This message arrives
at the desired server and waits for a time Wsl after which
it is processed during a time S 8l while the server produces
and encrypts and timestamp. The client then waits for the
timestamp to come from the server that arrives at time t n4 .
The message waits at the client for a time Wc3 before it is
served for a duration of Sc3 for the client to decrypt the
timestamp. The client then encrypts the message M in the
interval Wc4 and sends the message M to the server where it
arrives at t n5 , waits for a time We2 , and gets processed by
the server in the interval S B2 .
46
For the Kerberos protocol the following message lengths
are assumed:
Key = 8 bytes
Ticket =32 bytes
Authenticator = 24 bytes
Timestamp = 8 bytes
Mean message length = 125 bytes
Based on the above the service times are obtained:
Stl = (8+32)*8/TDES = 320/TDES
Sc2 = (8+24) *8/TDES = 256/TDES
Ssl = (32+24+8) *8/TDES = 512/TDES
Sc3 = 8*8/TDES = 64/TDES
Sc4 = 1000/TDES
Ss2 = 1000/TDES
TDES is the rate of symmetric key encryption (DES) in
bits/second. An exponential distribution is assumed for the
exchanged message [ELHA 97] . These service times are the
critical element in simulating the Kerberos system in OPNET.
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2. OPNET Model of a Single TGS Network.
The OPNET simulation is implemented as two separate
networks. The first is a simple ideal generator, a point-
to-point simplex link and a sink that is used as a control
simulation. The second is the same generator and sink with
the queuing processes given the above service times . The
ideal generator is sending traffic following a Poisson
process. The queues that represent the negotiation process
between the client, server and TGS are all active,
concentrating, bit-oriented (acb) FIFO queues.
The structure of this model is very simple. We simply
insert queues at the appropriate times and insert the
service times that the computation of the cryptographic
algorithm requires.
The service times are dependent on the rate of
symmetric key encryption, TDES . A simple Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet gives the results for an encryption rate of 150,
2,500 and 1Mbps bits per second by calculating the equations
presented above. These resultant service times can be
either placed in the queues as queuing delay or in the
connecting links as link delay. The network and node level
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Figure 17 - Network View of OPNET Kerberos Simulation
The simulation process works as follows. The client
object accepts the generated packet flow from the source and
delays it for time Scl before sending it to the TGS object.
The TGS object delays the packet flow for a time Stl and
then sends it back to the client object. Upon receiving the
packet flow from the TGS object the client object delays
the packet stream for the time Sc2 and forwards it to the
server object where the packet stream is delayed for a time
S sl seconds. The server object then forwards the packet
stream back to the client object where it is delayed by two
queues, S c3 and S c4 , for S c3 and S c4 seconds, respectively.
The client object then forwards the packet flow to the
server object where it undergoes the final S s2 second delay.
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The packet stream is then forwarded to the sink along a
point-to-point link.
The client module is shown in the left box of Figure
18. The client module is a comprised of two receiver
transmitter sets, one point-to-point transmitter, one point-
to-point receiver and four acb queues . The TGS shown in the
top right box of Figure 18 is composed of a logically-
associated receiver/transmitter and an acb queue. The
bottom right of Figure 18 shows the server_side node model
is composed of 1 logically associated receiver/transmitter,
two acb queues, a point-to-point receiver and a point-to-
point transmitter. The links are all generic point-to-point
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Figure 18 - Node Models of Client, Server and TGS
3. Results of Simulation
This simulation was designed to look at the mean
throughput of a 'Kerberized' link compared with a control
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link for different encryption times. Three different
encryption times were used: 150bps, 2.5kbps and 1Mbps.
Table 5 is a summary of the service times used.
150 bps . 5 kbps 1 Mbps
Service Time Stl 2.1333 0.1280 0.0003
Service Time S sl 3.4133 0.2048 0.0005
Service Time S s2 6.6667 0.4000 0.0010
Service Time Sc2 1.7067 0.1024 0.0003
Service Time S c3 0.4267 0.0256 0.0001
Service Time S c4 6.6667 0.4000 0.0010
Table 5 - Service Times per Encryption Rate
This paper focused on analyzing the control link
between the source and the sink and the 'Kerberized' link
between the to_external_server transmitter in the
server_side object and the sink. By comparing a control
traffic source with the delayed 'Kerberized' link, we hope
to achieve some insight into how this scheme affects traffic
patterns . To use the acb queues implemented in the model
the service times above are converted to service rates in




Which yields the results shown in Table 6 for a traffic rate
of 1024 kbps.
150 bps 2 . 5 kbps 1 Mbps
Service Rate SRtl 480 bps 8000 bps 3.2 Mbps
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Service Rate SRsl 6 00 bps 10000 bps 4 Mbps
Service Rate SRs2 3 00 bps 50 00 bps 2 Mbps
Service Rate SRc2 2400 bps 40000 bps 160 Mbps
Service Rate SRc3 53.6 bps 2560 bps 1024 Kbps
Service Rate SRc4 53.6 bps 2560 bps 1024 Kbps
Table 6 - Service Rates per Encryption Rate
Inserting these rates into the appropriate queues and
running the simulation yields the following throughput
results from OPNET modeler shown in Figures 19 to 22.
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Figure 19 - Throughput at TDES = 150bps
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Figure 21 - Throughput at TDES = 2.5Kbps
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Figure 22 - Throughput at TDES = 1Mbps
In conclusion, these results indicate that the Kerberos
model behaves in a manner consistent with intuition. The
throughput is very low at the low encryption rates compared
to the control link. The throughput matches the control
link at higher encryption rates. The user of this model
can add ideal generation sources and get a rough idea of
what sort of performance his cryptographic engines should
have in order to optimize throughput in a secure
environment. It should be noted that the transition is
nonlinear and the largest gains occur between 512 bps and
2500 bps. Above 2500 bps basically operates at line speed.
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B. SECURE ATM SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SIMULATION
1. CellCase Introduction
The CellCase Security System consists of two encryption
entities and one certificate server (CA) entity. The
cryptographic unit functions are intended to be transparent
to normal operations of end-user and network equipment. The
CellCase45 supports T3 and E3 data rates and interfaces.
The CellCasel55 supports 0C-3c interfaces [STEV 95] . The
CellCase product line goal is to support data rates at the
0C-12c (622 Mbps) level.
The CellCase Security System creates a secure point-to-
point connection in the following manner. First, a host
follows the standard SETUP-CONNECT procedure. The calling
cryptographic device (crypto A) checks the bandwidth
reservation for the connection; if the connection has
sufficient bandwidth, the call setup procedure continues.
This paper assumes that sufficient bandwidth is available.
When a connection has been established each
cryptographic device will send a certified exchange message,
containing its own public key certificate and a nonce (Cx,
Nx) . At this point each cryptographic device concurrently
verifies the certificate given by their peer through a
certificate authority (CA) . After receiving its peer's
public key certificate message, each cryptographic device
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proceeds concurrently to verify the certificate, check
access permissions, and generate a key distribution message
(KDM) consisting of its own sending session key and the
nonce received by the peer, encrypted with the peer's public
key and signed using its own private key. The KDM is then
sent to the peer cryptographic device on the established
connection. When the KDM exchange is finished, each
cryptographic device verifies the signature and decrypts the
message using its own private key. After the KDM is
decrypted, cryptographic device B now installs the sending
and receiving session keys and forwards the original SETUP
message from the called host. It sends a CONNECTED message
to cryptographic device A. Upon receipt of the CONNECTED
message, cryptographic device A installs the session keys
and then sends a CONNECT message back to the calling host,
which completes the secure connection. Figure 23 shows the
call setup procedure.
2. Secure ATM System Performance Metrics
a) Encryption Speed
A critical aspect to the performance analysis of a
secure ATM system is the encryption speed of the component
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Figure 23 - Call Setup Procedure of the CellCase System
during both call setup and traffic phases of the calling
process. Stevenson, Hillary and Byrd[STEV 95] indicate that
the ability to generate and switch keys on a cell by cell
basis is the main performance concern in achieving cell
transparency in a key-agile system. This problem is
mitigated in the CellCase approach by using a key table and
by limiting the possible number of active VCs . The ATM
encryption system proposed by Wigelt and Rahman [WEIG 95]
uses encryption speed as a key concern in their simulation
of secure ATM networks
.
In each case encryption speed determines the setup
time in the call setup phase and cell transfer delay in the
traffic phase. Results from simulations show that the added
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delay for the encrypted ATM cells consisted solely of the
delay due to encryption and decryption, when the encryption
speed was greater than the segmentation delay at the AAL.
b) Cell Transfer Delay (CTD)
The cell transfer time is a critical metric that
is the major throughput consideration. This is the time
delay experienced by cells using the connection as measured
on an end-to-end basis.
c) Authentications per Key
The CellCase system has no hard requirement for a
one-to-one relationship between two sites and a particular
key. The equipment can be configured to allow multiple
authentications based on one successful key exchange. The
setup time required will decrease as the ratio of the number
of authentications to keys goes up.
3 . CellCase ATM Encryptor OPNET simulation
The OPNET model presented here is one of the Call
Setup sequence of delays involved in the CellCase encryption
system. The structure of this model is very simple. The
model assumes that cryptographic negotiation can be best
represented by service delays in the call setup process.
Figure 24 shows the atm8_cellcase_mod_2 node model that is
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the heart of this simulation effort. Figure 24 follows the
call setup process for the CellCase process.
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Figure 24 - CellCase Call Setup Scheme
The queue objects are acb_fifo queues that can delay-
traffic by delaying the service rate parameter in the queue.
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The service rate that the queue model accepts is related to
two factors, the time of encryption/decryption and the
number of authorizations allowed per key. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to perform an analysis of this relation,
so a linear one is assumed to perform a very austere check
of model validity.
Figure 25 shows the network level view of the OPNET
simulation. Figures 26 and 2 7 respectively show the node
level views of the generator and sink. The ideal generator
has an interarrival rate of 0.01, which generates
approximately a 64 kbps bit stream. The packet size is set
at a constant rate of 53 bytes with a Poisson interarrival
distribution. The service rate of the queues in the
CellCase setup model, with the exception of the generate
certificate, sign, and decrypt queues are all set to a very
high rate of 155,000,000 bps which means that they will
simply pass through packets without delay. Figure 3 also



















Figure 25 - Network Level view of Simulation








Figure 26 - Node Level view of CellCase Generator Object
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Figure 27 - CellCase Sink Model Object
The generate_certif icate, sign and decrypt queues are
subject to the following assumptions: 1) the service rate is
limited to the rate of PK encryption, 2) the rate of PK
encryption is 32 kbps and 3) the service rate has a linear
relation to authorizations per key exchange. Table 7 below










Author i zat ions
per key
64K 32 kb/s 32 kb/s 1
64K 32 kb/s 64 kb/s 2
64K 16 kb/s 16 kb/s 1
64K 16 kb/s 32 kb/s 2
64K 16 kb/s 64 kb/s 4
Table 7 - Input values into CellCase Model Queues
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C. RESULTS OF SIMULATION
The simulation was run with the above service rates in
the generate certificate, sign and decrypt queues for a time
of 100 seconds with the hope of observing a linear
relationship between the service rate and the control link.
The output is the mean throughput analysis of the link from
the CellCase node model to the sink and from the control
generator to the sink. The results of the last three, with
service rates of 16kbps, 32kbps, and 64kbps are shown here.
The first two runs resulted in the same output as run number
four and run number five. Figure 28 shows the results of a
service rate of 16 kbps and one authorization per key.
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Figure 28 - CellCase Results with 16K Service Time and 1
Authorization per key
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The control link hovers around 50,000 to 60,000 bps
while the encrypted link hovers around 16 kbps . Figure 29
shows the notional results with 16 kbps and two
authorizations per key.
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Figure 29 - CellCase Results with 16K Service Time and 2
Authorizations per key
The control link hovers around 50,000 to 60,000 bps
while the encrypted link hovers around 32 kbps. Figure 30
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Figure 30 - CellCase Results with 16K Service Time and 4
Authorizations per key
With 16 kbps service time and four authorizations per
key the control link hovers around 50,000 to 60,000 bps




Figures 28, 2 9 and 3 show the same general
relationship as the three models shown in the Kerberos
model. The mean throughput is very stable on the low
throughput runs but very irregular as the data rate
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increases . The last run shows a spike where the encrypted
data actually outpaces the unencrypted data at the 6 OK data
rate level. Further runs of these models may be needed to
determine if this irregularity is due to the OPNET
simulation engine or some other problem. This OPNET model
extends the El-Hadidi, et . al [ELHA 97] queuing analysis
into the CellCase product. If validated, this process can be
used for many authentication services throughout DoD.
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VI CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUES FOR ENCRYPTION MODELLING RESEARCH
1. Call Setup time versus Authentication Policy
To make this a higher fidelity model further research
should be done on the relationship between call setup time
and the authentication key policy. While researching this
thesis, the author used the queuing analysis used of El-
Hadidi et al . [ELHA 97] to look at the number of
authorizations/key exchange versus the setup time. The
result for Kerberos is shown in Figure 31 and the result for

























Figure 31 - Authorizations/Key Exchange versus Setup Time
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Figure 32 - Authorizations/Key Exchange versus Setup Time
CellCase
In the simulation of the CellCase model, this thesis
assumed a linear relationship between the number of
authorizations/key exchange and the call setup time. Using
a M/G/l queuing model to calculate setup time shows a faster
drop-off of call setup time. It would be interesting to
isolate this relationship and use it in the OPNET models
provided.
2. Cryptographic Processing Rate versus Setup Time
The same model yielded some insights into the
relationship between the time of encryption and the setup
time. This relationship is shown, respectively, in Figure
3 3 and Figure 34 for the Kerberos and CellCase system.
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Cryptographic Processing Rate vs. Setup Time
Kerberos
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Figure 33 - Cryptographic Processing Rate vs. Setup Time
Kerberos
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Figure 34 - Cryptographic Processing Rate vs. Setup Time
CellCase
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This is a generally linear relationship. This
relationship was the one used to calculate the service times
in the CellCase model.
B. COMMENTS ON MODEL VALIDITY
1. Kerberos Model
The Kerberos Model presented here validates previous
analytic studies of the Kerberos service. The next stage of
this process is to conduct model validity studies with the
actual Kerberos system and compare results. This cannot be
considered a valid model until this is accomplished.
2 . CellCase Model
The CellCase Model provides a framework to conduct
analytic studies of the CellCase service. The next stage of
this process is to test the CellCase model with the actual




These models are in a very immature form but they are
novel as the author has found no operational security models
in the OPNET environment. There is a solid starting point
to build higher fidelity cryptographic performance models
from the lessons learned from this research. The
performance of future DoD networking efforts will very
probably need to factor in delay and throughput factors in
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encrypted data networks, particularly as network managers
scale PKI resources to larger and larger levels.
The next phase of this research would be twofold.
First, we need to validate the Kerberos and CellCase OPNET
models presented in this thesis. The Kerberos model can be
adapted to fit DISA's ongoing PKI initiative. Taking these
models and adapting them to a small PKI network like the
Defense Travel Office PKI testbed would allow real world
validation of the algorithms in this thesis and the OPNET
model. Second, the models here are shown as very simple
point-to-point networks. Research into adapting this model
to a multiple server/client/authenticator network in the
Kerberos OPNET model would yield valuable insights into the
performance problems that a viable PKI authentication
service such as the one DISA is now planning would have.
The performance implications that the current DISA PKI
medium assurance initiative implies across the DISN are
significant. The Kerberos model presented here can be
adapted to model the small systems being fielded now such as
the Defense Security Service, Navy Region San Diego and the
Office of the Army Chief of Staff. A continuation of this
research will be done, in one form or the other, simply
because the performance ramifications of overlaying a PKI
security structure will need to be thoroughly understood if
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the user is to get quality of service and informat:
assurance.
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APPENDIX A. OPNET CODE FOR ACB FIFO QUEUING MODEL
A. OPNET SOURCE CODE
/* Process model C form file: acbfifo.pr.c */
/* Portions of this file copyright 1992, 1996, 1998 by MIL 3, Inc. */
/* This variable carries the header into the object file */
static const char acb_fifo_pr_c [] = "MIL_3_Tfile_Hdr_ 5 ID 30A opnet 7 375CB7A6 375CB7A6 1 zn8wp
Administrator none none none 0";
/* OPNET system definitions */
#include <opnet.h>
FSM EXT DECS
/* Header Block */
#define QUEUE_EMPTY (op_q_empty ())
#define SVC_COMPLETION op_intrpt_type ()= OPCJNTRPT_SELF
#define ARRIVAL op_intrpt_type ()= OPC_INTRPT_STRM
/* End of Header Block*/
#if ! defined (VOSD_NO_FIN)
#undef BIN
#undef BOUT
#defme BIN _fstack_local_info.last_line_passed = LINE_ - _block_origin;
#define BOUT BIN
#define BINIT _fstack_local_info.last_Iine_passed = 0; blockorigin = LINE ;
#else
#define BINIT
#endif /* #if ! defined (VOSD_NO_FIN) */
/* State variable definitions */
typedef struct
{
/* Internal state tracking for FSM */
FSM_SYS_STATE




} acb fifo state;
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/* This macro definition will define a local variable called*/
/* "op_sv_ptr" in each function containing a FIN statement"./
/* This variable points to the state variable data structure, */
/* and can be used from a C debugger to display their values. */
#undef FIN_PREAMBLE
#define FINPREAMBLE acb_fifo_state *op_sv_ptr = pr_state_ptr;
/* No Function Block */
enum { blockorigin = LINE }
;















/** state (init) enter executives **/
FSM_STATE_ENTER_FORCED (0, stateO_enter_exec, "init", "acb_fifo () [init enter
execs]")
{
/* initially the server is idle */
server_busy = 0;
/* get queue module's own object id */
ownid = opidself ();
/* get assigned value of server */
/* processing rate */
op_ima_obj_attr_get (ownid, "servicerate", &service_rate);
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/** state (init) exit executives **/
FSM_STATE_EXIT_FORCED (0, stateO_exit_exec, "init", "acb_fifo () [init exit execs]")
{
}






FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (0, 1, state l_enter_exec, ;)
FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (1,2, state2_enter_exec, ;)
}
/** state (arrival) enter executives **/
FSM_STATE_ENTER_FORCED (1, state l_enter_exec, "arrival", "acb_fifo () [arrival
enter execs]")
{
/* acquire the arriving packet */
/* multiple arriving streams are supported. */
pkptr = op_pk_get (opintrptstrm ());
/* attempt to enqueue the packet at tail*/
/* of subqueue 0. */
if (op_subq_pk_insert (0, pkptr, OPC_QPOS_TAIL) != OPC_QINS_OK)
{
/* the inserton failed (due to to a */
/* full queue) deallocate the packet. */
op_pk_destroy (pkptr);
/* set flag indicating insertion fail */
/* this flag is used to determine */








/** state (arrival) exit executives **/
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/** state (arrival) transition processing **/





FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (0, 3, state3_enter_exec, ;)
FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (1,2, state2_enter_exec, ;)
}
/*• state (idle) enter executives **/




/** blocking after enter executives of unforced state. **/
FSM_EXIT (5,acb_fifo)
/** state (idle) exit executives **/










FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (0, 1, state l_enter_exec, ;)
FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (1, 4, state4_enter_exec, ;)
}
/* •/
/** state (svcstart) enter executives **/
FSM_STATE_ENTER_FORCED (3, state3_enter_exec, "svc_start", "acb_fifo ()
svc_start enter execs]")
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{I* get a handle on packet at head of subqueue */
I* (this does not remove the packet) */
pkptr = op_subq_pk_access (0, OPC_QPOS_HEAD);
/* determine the packets length (in bits) */
pk_len = op_pk_total_size_get (pkptr);
I* determine the time required to complete */
/* service of the packet
pk_svc_time = pklen / service_rate;
/* schedule an interrupt for this process */
I* at the time where service ends.
op_intrpt_schedule_self (op_sim_time () + pk_svc_time, 0);
/* the server is now busy.
server_busy = 1;
/** state (svc_start) exit executives **/




I** state (svc_start) transition processing **/
FSM_TRANSIT_FORCE (2, state2_enter_exec, ;)
/** state (svccompl) enter executives **/
FSM_STATE_ENTER_FORCED (4, state4_enter_exec, "svc_compl", "acb_fifo ()
[svccompl enter execs]")
{
/* extract packet at head of queue; this */
/* is the packet just finishing service */
pkptr = op_subq_pk_remove (0, OPC_QPOS_HEAD);
/* forward the packet on stream 0, causing */
/* an immediate interrupt at destination^/
op_pk_send_forced (pkptr, 0);
/* server is idle again. */
server_busy = 0;
}
/** state (svc_compl) exit executives **/
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FSM_CASE_TRANSIT (0, 3, state3_enter_exec, ;)







acb_fifo_init (void ** gen_state_pptr)
{
int _block_origin = 0;
static VosT_Cm_Obtype obtype = OPC_NIL;




/* Initialize memory management */
if (Vos_Catmem_Register ("proc state vars (acb_fifo)",
sizeof (acb_fifo_state), Vos_Vnop, &obtype)= VOSC_FAILURE)
FRET (OPC_COMPCODE_FATLURE)





/* Initialize FSM handling */


























/* Undefine shortcuts to state variables to avoid */
/* syntax error in direct access to fields of */









FIN (acb_fifo_svar (gen_ptr, var_name, var_p_ptr))
*varjp_ptr = (char *)VOS_NIL;
prs_ptr = (acb_fifo_state *)gen_ptr;
if (Vos_String_Equal ("serverbusy" , var_name))
{
*var_p_ptr = (char *) (&prs_ptr->server_busy);
goto funcreturn;
}
if (Vos_String_Equal ("servicerate" , varname))
{
*var_p_ptr = (char *) (&prs_ptr->service_rate);
goto func_return;
}
if (Vos_String_Equal ("own_id" , var_name))
{








[CHEN 96] Shaw-Cheng Chuang: "Securing ATM Networks", 3 rd ACM
Conference on Communications and Computer Security, pp 19-
21, 1996
[COHE 96] Cohen G. , Kamenel B., and Kubic C, "Security for
Integrated IP-ATM/Tactical -Strategic Networks", IEEE
Conference Proceedings, Military Communications Conference,
1996. MILCOM '96, Volume: 2 , Page(s): 456 -460 vol.2
[CONT 98] Office of Secretary of Defense, "Contingency C4ISR
Handbook for Integrated Planning", 1998
[ELHA 97] El-Hadidi M. , Hegazi N., and Asian H.
,
"Performance Analysis of the Kerberos Protocol in a
Distributed Environment", 2 nd IEEE Symposium on Computers and
Communications, Alexandria, Egypt, pp. 235-23 9, June 1997
[FEGH 99] Feghhi, J. and others, Digital Certificates:
applied Internet security, pp. 27-91, Addison-Wesley, 1999
[KUMA 95] Kumar, B., Broadband Communications: A
professionals guide to ATM, Frame Relay, SMDS, SONET and
BISDN, pp. 141-158, McGraw-Hill, 1995
[LIAN 96] Liang, Donglin, "A Survey on ATM Security",
http: //www.cis .ohio-state.edu/~jain/cis788-97/atm security/ index. htm
,
1996
[MCNC 98] MCNC Information Technologies Advanced Networking
Research and Secant Network Technologies and Portland State
University, Report Number A802, Final Report Key Agile
Cryptographic Systems and Covert Channels in Broadband
Public Systems, by F. Gong, pp. 7-49, July 1998
[NEUM 94] Neuman B. and Ts'o T., "Kerberos: An
Authentication Service for Computer Networks", IEEE
Communications, pp. 33-38, September 1994
[OPPL 96] Oppliger, R. , Authentication Systems for Secure
Networks, pp. 29-56, Artech House, 1996
81
[SHWB 95] Stevenson, D. Hillery, N. Winkelstein, D. and
Byrd, G. "Design of a Key Agile Cryptographic System for 0C-
12c Rate ATM," paper presented at the Symposium on Network
and Distributed System Security, San Diego, CA, Feb 1995
[SPEC 97] The ATM Forum, ATM Security System Specification,
Version 1.0 AF-SEC-0100 . 000
, pp. 15-37, 1997
[STEV 95] Stevenson D. , Hillery N. and Byrd G. "Secure
Communications in ATM Networks", Communications of the ACM,
pp. 45-52, February 19 95
[STIN 95] Stinson, D. R., Cryptography: Theory and Practice,
pp. 70-157, CRC Press, 1995
[THPW 98] Tarman T. D., Hutchinson R. L., Pierson L. G., and
Witzke E. L., "Algorithm Agile Encryption in ATM Networks",
Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society, pp. 57-64,
September 1998
[WEIG 95] Weigelt J.H. and M.H. Rahman, "Securing
Asynchronous Transfer Mode Based Networks Through the Use of
Encryption" IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and
Computer Engineering, 1995. Canadian Conference on
Volume: 1 , Page(s): 428 -431 vol.1
82
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Road, STE 0944
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 22060-6218




3 . Professor John C . McEachen EC/Mj 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Monterey, California 93943-5101
4 . Professor Dan C . Boger CC/Bo 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Department of Joint C4 I
Monterey, California 93943-5101
5 . LtCOL John H . Gibson CC/Gj 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Department of Joint C4 I
Monterey, California 93943-5101
6 . CPT Frederick R. Carlson 1




LTC (P) Timothy A. Fong 1
Deputy CEE for Information Assurance
Defense Information Systems Agency
Columbia Pike Offices
5600 Columbia Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22041-2717
8. Commander, Naval Information Warfare Activity 1
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
9 . Ms . Rosemary Wenchel 1
Naval Information Warfare Analysis Center
Naval Information Warfare Activity
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
83
10 . Naval Electronics Logistic Office 1
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Maryland 22215-5000
11 . Mr . Chris Kubic 1
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
84

60 "B^ignqm




